This paper wants to assess the extent of financial integration in the European Union using the FeldsteinHorioka criterion applied to regional data over the 1995-2000 period. Our article highlights several important outcomes. First, we find evidence that there is no correlation between savings and investment inside most of the considered countries, and we are able to solve the few puzzles facing us. Second, we find that overall financial integration between EU regions is almost complete. Additional investigations on consistent sub-groups of regions confirm that the withdrawal of institutional barriers to capital mobility is a powerful tool to achieve financial integration. However, we show that financial integration as measured by the Feldstein-Horioka relationship is impeded by distance and linguistic diversity, interpreted as proxies for transaction and information costs.
INTRODUCTION
In their seminal paper of 1980, Feldstein and Horioka examined the cross-sectional correlation between savings and investment across OECD countries during the sixties and the seventies and concluded that financial markets were poorly integrated. The intuition is straightforward: if capital is perfectly mobile, domestic savings and investment should not be correlated, and capital should move freely to the place where the rate of return is highest. Their results indicated a quite low degree of financial integration: despite a large volume of international capital movements, domestic savings and investment across OECD countries were found to be highly correlated, with estimated coefficients close to one. The resulting Feldstein-Horioka puzzle opened the way for an impressive number of subsequent analyses of the relationships between national savings and domestic investment. However, the puzzle seems to resist time, and appears to be even more at odd with facts nowadays, when conventional wisdom strongly believes that international capital markets are highly integrated (cf. Van Wincoop, 2001) .
The debate about the exact degree of financial integration is still raging however, as shown by the abundant literature offering alternative tests. The international smoothing/risksharing literature, for instance, still focuses on the savings/investment relationship, but with a different methodology. The main idea is that, in autarky, the only way to absorb real shocks is for a country to engage in intertemporal smoothing: saving (and investing) domestically when a positive shock occurs and dissaving (and disinvesting) domestically in case of a negative shock. This obviously pulls the savings/investment correlation toward one. In an open economy however, countries can engage in intertemporal trade, through foreign lending and borrowing, in order to smooth temporary shocks; but they can also implement the intra-temporal smoothing solution by making (explicit or implicit) risksharing arrangements, in order to mutually smooth idiosyncratic shocks. This may lower the savings/investment correlation, even towards zero in case of full risksharing (see Ubide, 1994; Lewis, 1996; Canova and Ravn, 1996 for tests of full risksharing; see also Asdrubali and Kim, 2007 , for recent developments on incomplete risksharing and international smoothing).
This paper belongs to a recent strand of empirical approaches that correlates regional (i.e., intranational) savings and investment. Indeed, regional investigation has recently received a growing attention, essentially because it allows the study of the Feldstein-Horioka relationship in a monetary integrated area that is free from a series of barriers and transaction costs. Using panel data, we directly address the problems of individual heterogeneity, endogeneity of right-hand side variables and serial correlation of residuals. We especially emphasize that failure to handle properly time and individual unobservable characteristics can bias the estimates of savings/investment correlation away from zero, erroneously supporting the case for a puzzle.
(1993)'s study of the United Kingdom. Therefore, this article is the first to provide an extensive regional analysis of the Feldstein-Horioka criterion for EU countries wherever it is possible and over a time span for which harmonized regional data are available -that is, the period 1995-2000. Consequently, one of the main purposes of this paper is to study the impact of the economic integration that has taken place over the last decades in Western Europe. This also leads to assess the correlation between investment and savings at a national level (i.e. between the regions forming a country). Finally, this paper emphasizes some specific factors that could lead to a weaker correlation between crossborder regional groups, such as the existence of a common language or geographical proximity. Conversely, we show that the savings/investment correlation tends to increase with distance between regions or countries and linguistic diversity.
The paper is structured as follows: section 1 provides a short overview of related literature and presents our motivations. Section 2 describes the methodology and the dataset, and section 3 discusses different sets of results. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) examined the cross-sectional correlation between savings and investment by testing this very simple equation:
PIECES IN THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA PUZZLE
(1) where represents the ratio of investment over Gross Domestic Product (GDP), that is the investment rate. Similarly, the ratio of savings over GDP, , can be interpreted as the savings rate of the economy. Index i stands for the considered country. Consequently, the value of the β parameter has been the focus of a substantial literature. Many studies have since investigated the significance and robustness of the β parameter, coming to findings supporting strongly the case for a puzzle in most cases.
A first strand of the literature tried to explain the so-called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle by focusing on the potential statistical drawbacks, like endogeneity or the existence of a cointegration relationship between savings and investment (see Feldstein and Horioka, 1980; Fieleke, 1982; Tobin, 1983; Frankel, 1986; Obstfeld, 1986; Summers, 1988; Bayoumi, 1990; Tesar, 1991; Coakley et al. 1996) . More recent statistical analyses, using cointegrated panel techniques and Monte-Carlo simulations, can also be found in Kim (2001) or Caporale et al. (2005) .
Another set of papers investigated the Feldstein-Horioka relationship on a regional basis, as originally suggested by Zecher (1976, 1984 Among this overview, the paper by Armstrong et al. (1996) offers an original perspective. They test the savings/investment correlation in the mid-1990s twelve EU members. Using national data, their paper supports the idea that the EU capital markets exhibit high levels of integration. However, the puzzle of negative coefficients remains, with a downward bias seemingly resulting from the inclusion of Portugal in the sample. Finally, they do not perform any kind of intranational analysis inside European Union countries, considered explicitly as homogenous regions part of a wider area. 1957 1953 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1971-1987 1961-1989 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1991 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1991 1975-1988 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1988 1961-1993 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1975-1990 1970-1990 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1975-1990 Estimate of comovement Beyond the updating of Armstrong et al. (1996) 's results using more recent regional data, the present paper has two main purposes. First, it aims to apply Bayoumi and Rose (1993) 's findings for the United Kingdom to as many European countries as possible, by testing the Feldstein-Horioka criterion on a regional basis for each of them. Second, the use of a regional basis will help to investigate the possibility of stronger transnational/crossborder financial integration between some specific regions, which could arise from geographic or historical reasons. Then, we are going to build on the following variant of equation 1: (2) where the letter j stands this time for regions, and not for countries. This will allow a double study, intranational on the one hand (how integrated can all regions from the same country be?), transnational on the other hand (how integrated may some regions from different countries be?).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY : FROM COUNTRIES TO REGIONS

DATASET AND THE CHOICE FOR DISPOSABLE INCOME AS A PROXY FOR SAVINGS
The series required for such a regional investigation on the savings/investment relationship are much more difficult to get than their national counterparts. Indeed, the heterogeneity of savings and investment definitions used in the few aforementioned studies comes mainly from the lack of easily accessible regional data. This leads to choices for different proxies and partial definitions according to the considered country (cf. for instance Bayoumi and Rose, 1993, on UK) . In the context of our research, an additional problem comes from the need for homogenous definitions of macroeconomic accounts across countries.
We were able to retrieve homogenous annual series for whole investment (private and public gross fixed capital formation, GFCF) and gross domestic product coming from Eurostat harmonized regional accounts, available over the 1995-2000 period (Regio NUTS 2, European System of Accounts, ESA 95. For Germany, only NUTS 1 data of GFCF were available). Unfortunately, Regio does not provide any harmonized savings data at the regional level 1 . However, a complete regional database of GFCF and savings is available for Germany, from the Statistics National Office of Baden-Württemberg (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg) . Regarding Italy, we were able to rebuild series of savings, using the difference between regional GDP data provided by Regio database and the total regional consumption, available from a regional database provided by the Italian research center CRENOS (Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud). For these two countries, a direct regional study of the Feldstein-Horioka criterion according to equation 2 can therefore take place. For the other EU countries, we decided to proxy regional savings using households' disposable income. This aggregate is accountably equal to the sum of households' consumption and savings 2 data.
Why is households' disposable income a good proxy for global (i.e. household, companies, government) savings? Actually, the choice for this proxy relies on the assumption that the household disposable income is highly correlated with global savings. Several statistical evidences provide us with strong reasons to support this hypothesis. Firstly, crosscorrelations of log-levels 3 of savings and disposable income for EU countries, plus German and Italian regions come with the following results:
TABLE 2. CORRELATION BETWEEN LOG-LEVELS OF SAVINGS AND DISPOSABLE INCOME
Ranking from 78 to 97%, the correlation criterion supports unequivocally our assumption. We can go further in the statistical investigation by regressing the log of disposable income over the log of savings, again for EU-15, Germany and Italy. Wooldridge (2002) test for temporal autocorrelation in panel data detected the presence of AR(1) residuals in all regressions, so regression were performed with Newey-West standard errors for coefficients -that is, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Results are depicted thereafter:
TABLE 3. REGRESSIONS OF LOG-DISPOSABLE INCOME OVER LOG-SAVINGS
Notes: a denoting significance at the 1 % level. Standard errors in parentheses.
A NEW LOOK AT THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA PUZZLE:
A "EUROPEAN-REGIONAL" PERSPECTIVE The regressions above also support the idea of a close positive link between savings and investment, even close to unity for EU. Finally, figure 1 below gives a visual idea of the relationship between disposable income and savings at the national level 4 : Figure 1 shows that disposable income mimics almost perfectly the evolutions of savings at the regional level. Therefore, we believe the statistical evidence is strong enough to postulate that the ratio of disposable income over GDP can substitute for savings rate. Formally, this gives:
FIGURE 1. DISPOSABLE INCOME AND SAVINGS ACROSS COUNTRIES
Finally, section 3 will provide a direct check for the empirical virtues of our proxying method by comparing the estimations resulting from the real savings data (equation 2) and the ones coming from disposable income (equation 3). This will be done for Germany, Italy and "EU(nat.)", that is, for European Union using national data, where each country is implicitly considered as a region. Eventually, it is useful to highlight that our dataset stands halfway between the one of Bayoumi and Rose (1993) , constrained to rely on partial and heterogenous definitions for variables, and the one of Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000) , who could access a complete and homogenous database. Consequently, we can consider that our estimations will be sufficiently reliable. Regarding the special cases of Germany and Italy, the national databases amount respectively to 80 and 114 observations. For all countries, the short time span prevents de facto to use the recent cointegration panel methods (Kim, 2001; Banerjee and Zanghieri, 2003) .
The first part of the subsequent analysis will follow explicitly the path opened by Bayoumi and Rose (1993) on the United Kingdom, and will endeavor to check if each country of our European sample can be considered as a highly integrated capital market 5 according to the Feldstein-Horioka equation. The second part tests the Feldstein-Horioka criterion on consistent transnational and/or intranational groups of regions, while the third part focuses on the influence of geographic and linguistic factors on the correlation between savings and investment.
Accounting for data constraints, we are able to study seven consistent transnational groups, indexed from 1 to 7 on the maps presented hereafter. Scandinavian group involves Denmark, Finland and all the regions of Sweden (Group 1 on the map). A second group features East of France (Alsace, Lorraine) and regions from West of Germany, which are Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz (Group 2). Rhônes-Alpes, Provence-AlpesCôtes d'Azur for France, and Piemonte, Lombardia, Valle d'Aosta, Liguria, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio for Italy, jointly form a consistent area covering Southeast of France and North of Italy (Group 3). Another pool (Group 4) includes Northern French regions (Nord-Pas de Calais, ChampagneArdenne, Picardie, Lorraine), and the bordering Belgian regions (Luxembourg, Namur, Hainaut, Vlaanderen, that is Flanders). We also consider the relevance of an area involving all regions from Belgium, Netherlands and neighboring German regions, which are Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Niedersachsen (Group 5). Encompassing Veneto, Salzburg, Tirol and Oberösterreich, group 6 tests the likelihood of an AustrianGerman-Italian mix. Finally, the capital group (7 on the map) contains all the capital regions or main economic centers of the surveyed countries: Paris, Berlin, Bonn (the former West Germany capital), Brussels, Wien, Rome, Milan, Copenhagen, Dublin, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Athens and Lisbon
6
. Regarding intranational specificities, we will focus primarily on North/South Italy, Flanders/Wallonia (Belgium), and West Germany/East Germany. Beyond the constraint of the number of observations, these divisions seem relevant both from historical and economic point of views. Building on results from section 3.1, French and Swedish specificities will also be investigated.
A "EUROPEAN-REGIONAL" PERSPECTIVE FIGURE 2. TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS Table 1 in section 1 reminds us that two competing methods have been used in the literature to estimate the FH relationship. On the one hand, the cross-sectional regression estimates β from: . JÉROME HERICOURT AND MATHILDE MAUREL 7 All details of the different tests, as well as the robustness estimates are available from the authors on request.
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 7
On the other hand, the panel regression induces β from the estimation of :
, where the index i stands for regions of the considered country or currency area. The panel regression includes individual fixed effects in the regression, which of course affects the results. Failure to account for individual unobservable characteristics can make the OLS estimator inconsistent through an omitted variable bias. We also have the intuition that this absence of individual effects could explain some of the puzzles found in the literature, like the significant negative coefficients found by Armstrong et al. (1996) -see section 3.1 infra for more details on that matter.
The same kind of reasoning can be made regarding year unobservable effects, which to our best knowledge, have barely been taken into account in the literature. The problem is even more crucial in the European context of this study, since the considered period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) includes the official launch of scriptural (written) euro 8 .
Furthermore, we have to take into account a possible endogeneity problem of right-hand side variables, namely the savings rate or the ratio . Regarding equation 3, the use of homogenized data coming from different national sources increases the risk of measurement errors across countries. The standard way to proceed in such cases is to differentiate the equation, and estimate it with instrumental variables. Therefore, we decided to differentiate equation 3, and we tested the relevance of estimating both equations 2 and 3 using instrumental variables (IV) 9 . Regarding equation 2, results from Hausman (1978) and Nakamura Nakamura (1981) tests highlight that the estimates from single least squares and 2SLS are statistically indistinguishable in all cases. For equation 3, IV and OLS estimates are also statistically identical according to the tests for all countries, even if a small uncertainty remains for Germany. An additional DavidsonMcKinnon (1993) test could not reject (at the 10% confidence level) the null hypothesis of exogeneity of both savings rate and ratio . We decided therefore to report OLS estimates since they are more efficient than IV estimates (Pagan, 1984) .
A NEW LOOK AT THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA PUZZLE: A "EUROPEAN-REGIONAL" PERSPECTIVE 8 It could also legitimately be argued that such an event is likely to have created a structural modification of the relationship between savings and investment. From a statistical point of view, however, the very short time span does not allow the implementation of standard structural breakdown tests for checking this intuition. We tackled this problem rerunning all regressions presented in section 4 on a shorter time period, excluding 1999 and 2000. This second set of estimates never differs from the one deduced on the all-sample period. This robustness check comes to support the idea of no significant breakdown following the introduction of the scriptural euro. This may mean that the latter did not fundamentally modify the process of financial integration started since the Single European Act of 1986. 9 The choice for instruments is often a complex matter, especially when estimations are performed over a short time period. In our case, the regional dimension reduced the set of potential instruments to an alternative between lagged savings rates and the ratio . Eventually, the latter appeared as the only possible instrument, since the use of savings rate lagged values has been rejected for Germany and Italy by Sargan (1958) overidentification test. This can probably be related to the serial correlation problems detected afterwards.
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Moreover, the time dimension of our study requires checking for the possibility of serial correlation in the residuals. To do so, we implement a Wooldridge (2002) test for temporal autocorrelation in panel data. The test highlights the presence of highly serially correlated residuals for EU(nat.) and Germany, but not for Italy, when estimating equation 2. For equation 3, the presence of serial correlation is confirmed for most countries.
At the end of the day, equation 2 will be estimated through a panel regression with regional and year fixed effects 10 . Formally, this gives:
where t stands for the considered period, α j is a dummy variable controlling for unobservable characteristics by region. λ t allows for year-fixed effects.
The panel regressions for EU(nat.) and Germany will postulate first-order autoregressive residuals and the Italian one will use standard identically and independently distributed errors. Concerning equation 3, the use of regional fixed effects is not relevant for a specification based on first differences. Indeed, the differentiation at the individual (regional) level de facto deletes them. However, we can still include year-fixed effects. Country-fixed effects are also added in the regressions on transnational groups, as an additional precaution against measurement errors in data collection across countries. Formally, this gives:
where t stands for the considered period and λ t allows for year fixed effects. A dummy variable will be added exclusively in transnational regressions, in order to control for unobservable characteristics by country.
In the context of the widespread serial correlation of residuals, all estimations based on equation 5 were processed using Ordinary Least Squares with Newey-West standard errors for coefficients -that is, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.
Interestingly, Wald tests strongly rejected the hypothesis of regional fixed effects being jointly equal to zero for equation 4. Regarding equation 5, Wald tests also supported the relevance of country-fixed effects for regressions on transnational groups 11 . The joint significance of time-fixed effects was also confirmed in a majority of cases for both equations 4 and 5. This is a clear indication that individual and time effects are not superfluous, at least on the statistical ground.
RESULTS : A DOUBLE LOOK AT EMU
THE INTRANATIONAL LOOK
The results for EU(nat.), Germany and Italy are based upon a complete dataset including investment and savings. First, estimates of equation 4 without (time and individual) fixed effects are shown in column (1), for comparison purposes. Then, a direct check for the validity of proxying savings by disposable income is proposed, by simply comparing the estimates of the Feldstein-Horioka model (equation 4) and those of equation 5. Table 4 also reports the results for the decomposition of Germany according to a West-East separation, and for Italy according to a North-South axis.
TABLE 4. COMOVEMENTS FOR EU-(NAT.), GERMANY AND ITALY
Notes: a denoting significance at the 1 % level. Standard errors in parentheses.
The comparison between the estimates from columns (1) and (2) emphasizes the relevance of fixed effects. While some estimates are very close, the ones of Germany, West Germany and Italy differ significantly. Interestingly, the three concerned parameters are all negative and significant without fixed effects, and very close to zero when fixed effects are included. Results from column (1) bring to mind the ones of Armstrong et al. (1996) on the same set of countries, or the ones of Dekle (1996) effects, and tended to find puzzling significant negative coefficients. Our own results in columns (1) and (2) provide a solution to that puzzle: they suggest that the significant negative sign exhibited by their results might be due to a lack of treatment of individual heterogeneity, whereas it is explicitly handled in the panel data context of our analysis.
A comparative look on columns (2) and (3) also confirms that disposable income is a relevant proxy for savings. In all cases, both estimates are not significantly different from zero. The signs are identical in four cases over seven, and the values of the coefficients are very close for EU as a whole, East Germany, Italy, North Italy and South Italy.
The estimates for EU(nat.) confirm that EU can be considered as a financially integrated area according to the Feldstein-Horioka criterion. Not significantly different from zero, the estimated β for equation 4 is positive. This result contrasts sharply not only with the ones obtained by Armstrong et al. (1996) , but also with those obtained by the most recent studies, especially the ones by Kim (2001) and Caporale et al. (2005) . Relying on very similar samples of OECD countries, both articles find evidence in favor of significantly positive coefficients. Our own estimates support the idea of a zero correlation at the end of the nineties for EU, probably due to the full freedom of capital movements since 1993. In any case, the subsequent study will enable us to check the robustness of that result on a regional basis.
Regarding Germany and Italy, the results corroborate the conclusions by Bayoumi and Rose (1993) on the United Kingdom. The estimates are never significant, for both countries and their subdivisions. Germany and Italy as whole exhibit coefficients very close to zero in absolute value, respectively -0.07 and 0.05. This suggests that both countries and their subdivisions exhibit a high degree of financial integration according to the Feldstein-Horioka definition. German and Italian examples confirm therefore the idea of Frankel (1992) that the exchange premium would explain the biggest part of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.
Another important lesson to be taken from the analysis is that equation 5 can be estimated instead of equation 4. The subsequent step is therefore to estimate equation 5 for all European countries, including those for whom real saving data are missing. This is done in the table 5 12 below: Some striking features emerge from a first reading of the table. First, the coefficient for the whole of Europe is positive and non-significant, standing at 0.08, supporting the hypothesis of a high degree of capital market integration. This fully validates the conclusions drawn from national data. Second, we have a strong majority of positive estimates, whereas negative β coefficients are widespread in the Feldstein-Horioka literature estimating intranational correlations (cf. table 1). This is in some way comforting, since it fits better with economic intuition in favor of a zero or positive correlation. Regarding the two negative ones, the Dutch β is largely insignificant. The Portuguese case is the only one to raise interrogations (cf. infra).
Two patterns of countries emerge. The first one, featuring Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and Austria, includes mainly countries from the geographic, historical, and economic core of Europe. For this group of countries, the Feldstein-Horioka coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Most of these countries are wealthy, the two biggest are members of the G7, and they are provided with a large international financial market. The second group of countries is composed of France, Portugal and Sweden. For them, the correlation between savings and investment is significantly different from zero, either positive (France and Sweden) or negative (Portugal). If the negative coefficients are hard to explain most of the time, the case of Portugal is pretty clear. Since 1975, the country benefits from a high level of FDI, and since 1986, from a high level of Structural Funds. Over 1995-2000 the inflows of FDI increased by 38.7% 13 but real GDP by only 21.7%, while the saving rate proxied by the ratio of disposable income over GDP decreased. As a consequence the β coefficient turns out to be negative in emerging countries like Portugal where investment exceeds for structural reasons the country saving capacity. This finding echoes a recent conclusion of Bayoumi and Park (2004) , namely that one key A NEW LOOK AT THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA PUZZLE:
A "EUROPEAN-REGIONAL" PERSPECTIVE determinant of financial integration is the level of economic development. The implication is that the ending process of Portuguese convergence should be associated to a decrease of the absolute value of the β coefficient towards zero 14 .
The case of France seems more puzzling. Indeed, one would have expected France to belong to the first group, since it is a wealthy, big country with a large financial market. Actually, the rationale behind the French and Swedish β might be the same, corresponding to geographical specificities. This hypothesis is tested in the next subsection. Table 6 depicts the estimates of equation 5 for the subsets of regions previously described. Negative coefficients represent a small minority. However, most of the results are not significantly different from zero, with five exceptions: the estimates for G7, the two Flanders, the South-East of France and Sweden without its three main cities are significantly positive. 
CROSS-BORDERS REGIONS
0.48
The coefficient characterizing the degree of financial integration for Scandinavian countries is close to zero. These countries are related by close commercial links, echoing a result by Bayoumi and Park (2004) who highlight that "finance follows trade" (p. 3 and p.19), i.e. that financial integration is superior in areas where the intra-regional trade is highly developed. It is also worth noticing that G1 group is mainly made of regions (those of Sweden plus Denmark) which are excluded from the European process of monetary integration. In the same spirit, the groups based upon historical links, like G3, G4 and G6, are financially integrated, with coefficients not significantly different from zero. Groups 2 and 5 display negative coefficients, none of them being statistically significant 15 .
At the end of the day, all groups from 1 to 6 seem characterized by a high degree of financial integration, which highlights the importance of sharing a common border and/or a common language for promoting capital mobility (cf. Bayoumi and Park, 2004) . The positive coefficient for G7 (capitals and main economic centers) or the relatively low degree of financial integration between capitals, which by definition do not share a common border and do not speak the same language
16
, supports a contrario the aforementioned result about borders and languages. Distance may also represent a suitable explanation, as shown by Portes and Rey (2005) . They use distance as a proxy for information costs and for asymmetry of information between domestic and foreign investors. Using a gravity approach, they show that distance exerts a negative influence on international capital flows. Our cross-borders regions are characterized by short distances amongst them, which suggest the same link between geography (distance) and finance. Consequently, European financial integration, while being strongly supported by the process of EMU, remains somewhat imperfect because of phenomena related to distance and to a kind of home market bias. Results of section 3.3 hereafter will provide empirical support to this intuition.
Results for intranational sub-groups do not bring any big novelty concerning Germany and Italy: as already mentioned, German and Italian sub-national groups are well integrated according to Feldstein-Horioka criterion. This is not the case for Flanders however, which is characterized by a positive and significant coefficient around 0.6, whether Brussels is included in the estimation or not. This low capital mobility may be explained by the practice of a language (the Flemish variant of Dutch) which is different from the one of the main local financial center (the French for Brussels). Once again, the linguistic barrier may explain this joint inertia of savings and investment.
A "EUROPEAN-REGIONAL" PERSPECTIVE
The cases of France and Sweden are quite different. For both of them, the explanation seems mainly geographical. The rationale for the Swedish β equal to 0.44 is that the distribution of the population is unequal: it is concentrated in the south, with a density of 253 inhabitants per km 2 in the urban triangle (Malmö, Göteborg, Stockholm) but only 3 in the region of Norrbotten. As a consequence, most of the economic activity is likely to be concentrated in the three corresponding regions from NUTS 2 classification -that is Stockholm, Sydsverige, Västsverige. Conversely, the savings and investment rate of the northern regions should be characterized by a huge inertia, due to the lack of investment opportunities and the underdevelopment of financial intermediation. This intuition is supported by the two estimates presented in table 6. Estimating the Feldstein-Horioka relationship on the three regions forming the urban triangle leads to a β coefficient equal to 0.13, not significantly different from zero. Consequently, capital seems to move freely across the three main economic centers of the country, which seems quite natural. Conversely, the estimation on all Sweden but these specific three regions is significant and reaches 0.93, confirming the aforementioned argument.
Turning to France, the exclusion of regions from the South-East (Auvergne, Rhône-Alpes, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon and Corse) makes the French β equal to 0.20, clearly non significant from zero. Conversely, when estimating the Feldstein-Horioka relationship only on these regions, one finds out a significant coefficient equal to 0.43. Two distinct explanations can be taken into account. Firstly, Auvergne, Languedoc-Roussillon and Corse are characterized by low population densities (respectively 50, 84 and 30 inhabitants per km 2 ), well below French average (112 inhabitants/km 2 ) and a lower level of GDP per capita. The reasoning is therefore the same that the one used for Swedish northern regions. Secondly, Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur host respectively Marseille and Lyon, the 2 nd and 3 rd biggest cities of France. They are likely to attract a huge part of the regional savings and investment, generating therefore the partial correlation observed in the data.
THREE KEYS FOR ONE ENIGMA? THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA PUZZLE EXPLAINED BY DISTANCE, CONTIGUITY AND LANGUAGE
Previous results lead us to the intuition that some specific factors may have a recurrent influence on the relationship between the savings and investment rates, namely distance, language and a common border. We propose to test this intuition by using the latter as righthand side variables in a set of estimations where the explained variable would be the βs computed on transnational groups of regions or countries. The concerned estimates are all βs from G1 to G7 plus the first estimates of tables 4 and 5, that is, the ones on EU as a whole.
The explanatory variables were created using the "dist_cepii" and " They provide measures of different distance variables and dummy variables used to identify particular links between countries such as common languages and contiguity. More precisely, we take the log of distance between the most populated cities as a measure of distance (variable Dist). The contiguity variable (variable Combord) is created according to the following rule: it takes the value 1 if all regions share a common border (that is, for G1 to G6) and 0 otherwise (that is, for G7 and estimates on whole EU).
Eventually, four dummies were created, for Dutch, English, German and French. We retained these four languages according to a simple criterion: each is spoken at least in two countries of our sample. They take the value 1 if the language is spoken among the considered regions, 0 otherwise. Formally, the regression model is as follows:
where G = G1,…,G7, EU(nat.), EU(NUTS2). i and j (i=j) are all regions included in group G.
Eventually, the estimation we want to perform is not a standard one. Indeed, the dependent variable is not observed, but estimated from previous regressions. The presence of a generated regressand means that the OLS standard errors are invalid (Pagan, 1984) . We are therefore in the context of two-step estimations. Equation 6 will be estimated using OLS, but the standard errors will be bootstrapped using 250 replications to account for the presence of a generated explained variable (cf. Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) . Table 7 provides different estimates where the right-hand side variables are included separately, then altogether: Results are totally in line with the intuitions delivered in sections 3.1 and 3.2. In a few words, the correlation between investment and savings increases with the log of distance, and decreases with the presence of a common border and the practice of common languages. Almost all estimated parameters are significant, often strongly (at the 1% level). The only noticeable exception is the French language, which does not seem to influence the level of Feldstein-Horioka's β whatever the considered specification may be. Conversely, the Dutch language seems to have the strongest negative impact (between -0.15 and -0.23) on the investment savings correlation, before German (-0.13 to 0.20) and English (-0.06 to -0.13). On the whole, we can therefore conclude that not sharing these languages is an obstacle to financial integration, raising the correlation savings/investment. Common borders decrease Feldstein-Horioka's β by 0.05 to 0.06. Eventually, the β grows with distance by 0.12 to 0.18.
These results are qualitatively and quantitatively strongly robust to various robustness checks, all available upon request to the authors. We find a persistent positive impact of distance even when using several alternative measures, such as the log of distance between capitals or the log of distance between the biggest cities of two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall country's population. Results are also similar when equation 6 is estimated on subsamples. Especially, estimated parameters remain identical if we include alternatively the two measures of financial integration on EU, that is the one coming from national data (from table 4) and the one coming from regional data (from table 5). Finally, the significance of the results is not affected by a lower (100 or 200) of a higher (500 or 1000) number of bootstrap replications for standard errors. 
CONCLUSION
Our major original contribution in this paper consists in applying the Feldstein-Horioka criterion to European regional data for a large number of EU members. This dataset allowed us to estimate the comovement coefficient between savings (or a proxy for savings) and investment not only within each individual country but also between transnational groups or within intranational sub-groups. Our article reports several important outcomes.
First of all, financial integration seems to be achieved within most of the considered countries, which corroborates a contrario Frankel (1992) 's hypothesis of a currency premium impeding the realization of a perfect financial world. Moreover, we offer an explanation for some puzzles already pointed out in the literature like the negative coefficient in the Portuguese case, and new ones like the French and Swedish positive coefficients. As in Bayoumi and Park (2004) , we especially argue that the process of economic development and the spatial distribution of the population do influence the extent of financial integration.
Besides, our results tend to indicate that overall financial integration seems to be completed with the euro launch. In order to shed a new light on the latter result, we have tested the Feldstein-Horioka equation over consistent sub-groups of regions (designed according to geographical, economic or historical criteria). Our analysis emphasizes that the withdrawal of institutional barriers to capital mobility is a powerful tool to achieve financial integration, but it may not be sufficient in some circumstances. Following a recent strand of research applying the analytical frameworks of international trade to financial transactions, we show that financial integration as measured by the Feldstein-Horioka relationship is not impeded by the existence of borders, but by distance and by linguistic diversity, interpreted as proxies for transaction and information costs.
A NEW LOOK AT THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA PUZZLE: A "EUROPEAN-REGIONAL" PERSPECTIVE
